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Backward unraveling over time: the evolution of strategic behavior in the entry level British medical labor markets

journal contribution
posted on 2001-06-01, 00:00 authored by M U Ünver
This paper studies an evolutionary programming technique, namely a genetic algorithm, to analyze how a population of decision-makers learn to coordinate the selection of an equilibrium or a social convention in a two-sided matching game with incomplete information. In the contexts of centralized and decentralized entry-level labor markets, evolution and adjustment paths of unraveling are explored using this technique in an environment inspired by the Kagel and Roth (2000. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(1), 201-235) experimental study. As an interesting result, it is demonstrated that stability need not be required for the success of a matching mechanism under incomplete information in the long run.

History

Journal

Journal of economic dynamics and control

Volume

25

Issue

6-7

Pagination

1039 - 1080

Publisher

Elsevier

Location

Amsterdam, The Netherlands

ISSN

0165-1889

Language

eng

Publication classification

C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

2001, Elsevier Science B.V.

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