Central-bank independence, economic behavior, and optimal term lengths

Version 2 2024-06-18, 04:36

Version 1 2019-07-22, 09:38

journal contribution

posted on 2024-06-18, 04:36 authored by CJ Waller, CE Walsh

Central-bank independence, economic behavior, and optimal term lengths

History

Journal

American economic review

Volume

86

Pagination

1139-1153

Location

Nashville, Tenn.

ISSN

0002-8282

Language

English

Author URL

http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:A1996WA76500006&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=a045e4b2bb1f2b747c68c720ec8913b7

Publication classification

C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Issue

5

Publisher

American Economic Association

Publication URL

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2118283

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Categories

Other economics not elsewhere classified

Keywords

Social Sciences Economics Business & Economics Inflation rates Central banks Monetary policy Political partisanship Conservatism Economic independence Central bank independence Supply shocks

Licence

All Rights Reserved

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