File(s) under permanent embargo

Charles Peirce's limit concept of truth

journal contribution
posted on 01.01.2014, 00:00 authored by Cathy LeggCathy Legg
This entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or ‘limit’ of inquiry. This account is distinct from – and arguably more objectivist than – views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its ‘internal realism’, not realist enough.

History

Journal

Philosophy compass

Event

Philosophy Compass

Volume

9

Issue

3

Pagination

204 - 213

Publisher

Wiley-Blackwell

Location

Chichester, Eng.

ISSN

1747-9991

Language

eng

Publication classification

C Journal article; C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

2014, The Authors, Philosophy Compass and Wiley-Blackwell

Usage metrics

Read the peer-reviewed publication

Categories

Exports