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Committees with leaks

Version 2 2024-06-13, 09:26
Version 1 2015-09-24, 15:51
journal contribution
posted on 2024-06-13, 09:26 authored by SP Ghosh, J Roy
We analyze the quality (informativeness and efficiency) of advice obtained from a committee of careerist experts where voting is secret but voting profiles are ‘leaked’ with an exogenously given probability. We show that fully informative voting is achievable only when the common prior is not too informative, the committee uses the unanimity rule and faces random leakage. It is then shown that informativeness and efficiency are mutually exclusive properties of committees with careerist experts.

History

Journal

Games and economic behavior

Volume

90

Pagination

207-214

Location

Amsterdam, The Netherlands

ISSN

0899-8256

Language

eng

Publication classification

C Journal article, C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

2015, Elsevier

Publisher

Elsevier