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Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms

journal contribution
posted on 2013-05-01, 00:00 authored by Yves SprumontYves Sprumont
Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms

History

Journal

Journal of Economic Theory

Volume

148

Pagination

1102-1121

Publisher DOI

ISSN

0022-0531

eISSN

1095-7235

Language

en

Notes

A single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We o¤er an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto- optimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free mechanisms. These mechanisms form a one-parameter in nite family; the Vickrey mechanism is the only Groves mechanism in that family.

Publication classification

C Journal article, C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Issue

3

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Publication URL

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    Keywords

    Department of Economics

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    All Rights Reserved

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