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Corruption via media capture : the effect of competition

journal contribution
posted on 01.04.2016, 00:00 authored by Samarth VaidyaSamarth Vaidya, R Gupta
In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co-opts with the government. We find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former, media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption.

History

Journal

Southern economic journal

Volume

82

Issue

4

Pagination

1327 - 1348

Publisher

Wiley-Blackwell

Location

Hoboken, N.J.

ISSN

0038-4038

eISSN

2325-8012

Language

eng

Publication classification

C Journal article; C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

2015, Southern Economic Association