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Distance bounding facing both mafia and distance frauds

Version 2 2024-06-04, 14:37
Version 1 2018-04-16, 17:14
journal contribution
posted on 2024-06-04, 14:37 authored by R Trujillo Rasua, B Martin, G Avoine
Contactless technologies such as radio-frequency identification, near field communication, and sensor networks are vulnerable to mafia and distance fraud. These types of fraud are aimed at successfully passing an authentication protocol by cheating on the actual distance between the prover and the verifier. Distance-bounding protocols have been designed to cope with these security issues, but none of them properly resist these two types of fraud without requiring additional memory and computation. The situation is even worse considering that just a few distance-bounding protocols are able to deal with the inherent background noise on the communication channels. This paper introduces a noise-resilient distance-bounding protocol that resists both mafia and distance fraud. The security of the protocol is analyzed against known attacks and illustrated by experimental results. The results demonstrate the significant advantage of the introduced lightweight design over previous proposals.

History

Journal

IEEE transactions on wireless communications

Volume

13

Pagination

5690-5698

Location

Piscataway, N.J.

ISSN

1536-1276

Language

eng

Publication classification

C Journal article, C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

2014, IEEE

Issue

10

Publisher

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers