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Do jurisdictions compete on taxes? A meta-regression analysis
journal contribution
posted on 2014-12-01, 00:00 authored by J Costa-Font, F De-Albuquerque, Chris DoucouliagosChris DoucouliagosA sizable empirical literature examines government fiscal interactions. However, the empirical evidence is very mixed. We apply meta-regression analysis to quantify the size of inter-jurisdictional fiscal interactions and to explain the heterogeneity in empirical estimates. Several robust results emerge. While there are significant country differences, tax interactions exist in all countries studied and they are strongest in terms of total tax and weakest in terms of income tax. Interactions differ according to level of government: compared to the municipal level, horizontal tax competition is stronger when the jurisdiction is a county or a nation. We show that tax competition has actually not grown over time and that econometric specifications and estimation strategies influence reported fiscal interactions.
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Journal
Public choiceVolume
161Issue
3Pagination
451 - 470Publisher
SpringerLocation
New York, N.Y.Publisher DOI
ISSN
0048-5829eISSN
1573-7101Language
engPublication classification
C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal; C Journal articleCopyright notice
2014, Springer Science+Business Media New YorkUsage metrics
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