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Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods

journal contribution
posted on 1998-01-01, 00:00 authored by Yves SprumontYves Sprumont
Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods

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We reconsider the problem of provision and cost-sharing of multiple public goods. The efficient equal factor equivalent allocation rule makes every agent indifferent between what he receives and the opportunity of choosing the bundle of public goods subject to the constraint of paying r times its cost, where r is set as low as possible. We show that this rule is characterized in economies with a continuum of agents by efficiency, a natural upper bound on everyone’s welfare, and a property of solidarity with respect to changes in population and preferences.

Publication classification

C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Journal

Social Choice and Welfare

Volume

15

Pagination

543-558

ISSN

0176-1714

eISSN

1432-217X

Issue

4

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

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