Deakin University
Browse

File(s) under permanent embargo

Firm compliance with social insurance obligations where there is a weak surveillance and enforcement mechanism: empirical evidence from Shanghai

Version 2 2024-06-13, 08:58
Version 1 2015-08-25, 15:08
journal contribution
posted on 2024-06-13, 08:58 authored by P Maitra, R Smyth, I Nielsen, C Nyland, C Z hu
This article examines why firms in Shanghai comply or over-comply with social insurance obligations in a regulatory environment where the expected punishment for non-compliance is low. Our first finding is that firms found to be in non-compliance in the first audit in 2001 were moved into a separate violation category and the probability of being reaudited in 2002 was significantly higher if the firm was in that category. Our second main result is that, across the board, firms which were reaudited continued to underpay in 2002 but the extent of underpayment was significantly reduced. © 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

History

Journal

Pacific economic review

Volume

12

Pagination

577-596

Location

London, Eng.

ISSN

1361-374X

eISSN

1468-0106

Language

eng

Publication classification

C Journal article, C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

2007, Wiley

Issue

5

Publisher

Wiley

Usage metrics

    Research Publications

    Exports

    RefWorks
    BibTeX
    Ref. manager
    Endnote
    DataCite
    NLM
    DC