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Ill-defined versus precise pre-play communication in the traveler's dilemma

Version 2 2024-06-17, 18:46
Version 1 2016-05-18, 14:46
journal contribution
posted on 2024-06-17, 18:46 authored by S Chakravarty, E Dechenaux, J Roy
This article reports results from an experiment comparing the effects of vague versus precise pre-play communication in a highly competitive two-player game with conflicting interests. In the classic Traveler's Dilemma, non-binding precise messages about intent of play are pure cheap talk. We conjecture that a form of imprecise pre-play communication whereby subjects can submit ill-defined messages may help foster cooperation because of their vagueness. Comparing behavior both across modes of communication and to a baseline case without communication, we find that cooperation is highest when players can communicate using precise numerical messages. When communication with ill-defined messages is allowed, then conditional on receiving a message, subjects act more cooperatively than when no message is received. However, overall, the ability to exchange ill-defined messages does not substantially improve cooperation.

History

Journal

Southern economic journal

Volume

77

Pagination

351-368

Location

Chichester, Eng.

ISSN

0038-4038

Language

eng

Publication classification

C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal, C Journal article

Copyright notice

2010, Wiley-Blackwell

Issue

2

Publisher

Wiley-Blackwell

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