Deakin University
Browse

File(s) under permanent embargo

Kidney exchange

journal contribution
posted on 2004-05-01, 00:00 authored by A E Roth, T Sönmez, M U Ünver
Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also many transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of immunological incompatibility, but each patient can receive a kidney from the other donor. Exchanges are also made in which a donor-patient pair makes a donation to someone waiting for a cadaver kidney, in return for the patient in the pair receiving high priority for a compatible cadaver kidney when one becomes available. There are stringent legal/ethical constraints on how exchanges can be conducted. We explore how larger scale exchanges of these kinds can be arranged efficiently and incentive compatibly, within existing constraints. The problem resembles some of the "housing" problems studied in the mechanism design literature for indivisible goods, with the novel feature that while live donor kidneys can be assigned simultaneously, cadaver kidneys cannot. In addition to studying the theoretical properties of the proposed kidney exchange, we present simulation results suggesting that the welfare gains from larger scale exchange would be substantial, both in increased number of feasible live donation transplants, and in improved match quality of transplanted kidneys.

History

Journal

Quarterly journal of economics

Volume

119

Issue

2

Pagination

457 - 488

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Location

Oxford, Eng.

ISSN

0033-5533

Language

eng

Publication classification

C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

2004, President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Usage metrics

    Research Publications

    Exports

    RefWorks
    BibTeX
    Ref. manager
    Endnote
    DataCite
    NLM
    DC