MANAGERS' COMPENSATION AND MISREPORTING: A COSTLY STATE VERIFICATION APPROACH

journal contribution

posted on 2023-05-26, 06:00 authored by Angelo Baglioni, Luca Colombo

MANAGERS' COMPENSATION AND MISREPORTING: A COSTLY STATE VERIFICATION APPROACH

History

Journal

ECONOMIC INQUIRY

Volume

47

Pagination

278-289

Publisher DOI

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00114.x

ISSN

0095-2583

eISSN

1465-7295

Language

English

Author URL

https://www.webofscience.com/api/gateway?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000265425500007&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=a045e4b2bb1f2b747c68c720ec8913b7

Publication classification

C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Issue

2

Publisher

WILEY-BLACKWELL

Publication URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00114.x

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Categories

Other economics not elsewhere classified

Keywords

Social Sciences Economics Business & Economics EARNINGS MANAGEMENT EQUITY INCENTIVES OPTIMAL-CONTRACTS STOCK-OPTIONS COLLUSION CHOICES MODEL DEBT RISK

Licence

All Rights Reserved

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