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Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution

journal contribution
posted on 2000-01-01, 00:00 authored by Marco MariottiMarco Mariotti
The Nash Bargaining Solution is characterised by using the new axiom of Maximal Symmetry in place of Nash's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Symmetry. This axiom expresses the idea that a fair arbitrator should treat symmetric alternatives in the same way, subject to the feasibility constraint. An advantage of the proposed characterisations is that they are valid on a wide set of domains, in particular domains including, or consisting of, non-convex problems. © Springer-Verlag 2000.

History

Journal

Social Choice and Welfare

Volume

17

Issue

1

Pagination

45 - 53

ISSN

0176-1714

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