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Merleau-Ponty and Embodied Cognitive Science

journal contribution
posted on 2014-01-01, 00:00 authored by Christopher PollardChristopher Pollard
What would the Merleau-Ponty of Phenomenology of Perception have thought of the use of his phenomenology in the cognitive sciences? This question raises the issue of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the relationship between the sciences and philosophy, and of what he took the philosophical significance of his phenomenology to be. In this article I suggest an answer to this question through a discussion of certain claims made in connection to the “post-cognitivist” approach to cognitive science
by Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher and Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch. I suggest that these claims are indicative of an appropriation of Merleau-Ponty’s thought that he would have welcomed as innovative science. Despite this, I argue that he would have viewed this use of his work as potentially occluding the full philosophical significance that he believed his phenomenological investigations to contain.

History

Journal

Discipline Filosofiche

Volume

24

Issue

2

Pagination

67 - 90

Publisher

Quodlibet

Location

Italy

ISSN

1591-9625

Publication classification

C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

2014, Quodlibet

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