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Objective Intentionalism and Disagreement

journal contribution
posted on 01.01.2021, 00:00 authored by David TanDavid Tan
AbstractIntentionalist theories of legal interpretation are often divided between objectivist and subjectivist variants. The former take an interpretation to be correct depending on what the reasonable/rational lawmaker intended or what the reasonable/rational audience thinks they intended. The latter take an interpretation to be correct where the interpretation is what the speaker actually intended. This paper argues that objectivism faces serious problems as it cannot deal with disagreement: reasonable and rational persons can often disagree as to what the interpretation of a text should be. It also defends subjectivism against criticisms by objectivists.

History

Journal

Legal Theory

Volume

27

Issue

4

Pagination

316 - 351

Publisher

Cambridge University Press

Location

Cambridge, Eng.

ISSN

1352-3252

eISSN

1469-8048

Language

English

Publication classification

C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

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