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On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties

journal contribution
posted on 2017-11-01, 00:00 authored by O Kesten, M Kurino, Utku UnverUtku Unver
This paper studies the problem of assigning indivisible objects to . n agents when each agent consumes one object and monetary transfers are not allowed. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) proved that for . n=3, the probabilistic serial mechanism is characterized by the three axioms of ordinal efficiency, envy-freeness, and weak strategy-proofness. We show that this characterization does not extend to problems of arbitrary size; in particular, it does not hold for any . n≥5. A number of general characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism have been obtained in the recent literature by replacing weak strategy-proofness with various invariance axioms while retaining ordinal efficiency and envy-freeness. We show that weak strategy-proofness is in fact logically independent of all invariance axioms used in these characterizations.

History

Journal

Mathematical social sciences

Volume

90

Pagination

56 - 62

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Location

Amsterdam, The Netherlands

ISSN

0165-4896

Language

eng

Publication classification

C Journal article; C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

2016, Elsevier B.V.