Payoff inequity reduces the effectiveness of correlated-equilibrium recommendations
Version 2 2024-06-03, 14:19
Version 1 2018-09-01, 00:00
journal contribution
posted on 2024-06-03, 14:19 authored by N Anbarcı, N Feltovich, MY GürdalPayoff inequity reduces the effectiveness of correlated-equilibrium recommendations
History
Related Materials
- 1.
Location
Amsterdam, The NetherlandsLanguage
EnglishPublication classification
C Journal article, C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journalCopyright notice
2018, Elsevier B.V.Journal
European Economic ReviewVolume
108Pagination
172-190ISSN
0014-2921eISSN
1873-572XPublisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BVUsage metrics
Keywords
Social SciencesEconomicsBusiness & EconomicsCorrelated equilibriumRecommendationsInequityOther-regarding behaviourLevel-k reasoningFOCAL POINTSCOORDINATION FAILUREPLAYERS MODELSCHEAP TALKGAMESRECIPROCITYCOMPETITIONFAIRNESSCOMMUNICATIONEFFICIENCYDepartment of Economics3803 Economic theory3801 Applied economics
Licence
Exports
RefWorks
BibTeX
Ref. manager
Endnote
DataCite
NLM
DC