Deakin University
Browse

File(s) under permanent embargo

Protection versus promotion: an empirical investigation

journal contribution
posted on 2004-07-01, 00:00 authored by D Mitra, D Thomakos, Mehmet UlubasogluMehmet Ulubasoglu
Using Turkish industry-level data from 1983 to 1990, we find that politically organized industries receive both higher protection and promotion than unorganized ones. Tariff rates are decreasing (increasing) in the import-penetration ratio and the absolute value of the import-demandelasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. Subsidy rates are decreasing (increasing) in the output-supply elasticity for organized (unorganized) industries. The results are consistent with the predictions of the Grossman–Helpman model and its extension in this paper. The mix of protection and promotion is inversely related to the ratio of their respective marginal deadweight cost measures.

History

Journal

Economics & Politics

Volume

16

Issue

2

Pagination

147 - 162

Publisher

Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Location

Oxford, England

ISSN

0954-1985

Language

eng

Notes

Published Online: 17 Jun 2004

Publication classification

C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

2004, Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Usage metrics

    Research Publications

    Exports

    RefWorks
    BibTeX
    Ref. manager
    Endnote
    DataCite
    NLM
    DC