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Simultaneous benefit maximization of conflicting opinions: modeling and analysis

journal contribution
posted on 2020-06-01, 00:00 authored by Luxing YangLuxing Yang, P Li, X Yang, Yong XiangYong Xiang, Y Y Tang
There are a multitude of opinions that are popular in online social networks (OSNs). Typically, an opinion creator attempts to push his opinion to OSN users to gain the maximum possible benefit. In the situation that there are a conflicting pair of opinions, this article is devoted to developing a pair of opinion-pushing strategies that are acceptable to both of the two opinion creators. Based on a novel conflicting opinion propagation model, we model the original problem as a differential game-theoretic problem. By means of differential game theory, we derive a promising strategy-pair of the game-theoretic problem, accompanied with a few examples. Finally, we find that the promising strategy pair outperforms a large number of randomly generated strategy pairs in the sense of Nash equilibrium solution concept. Therefore, we recommend the two opinion-pushing strategies in the promising strategy pair to the two opinion creators, respectively. This article has potential applications in diverse areas such as misinformation restraint and competitive viral marketing.

History

Journal

IEEE systems journal

Volume

14

Issue

2

Pagination

1623 - 1634

Publisher

IEEE

Location

Piscataway, N.J.

ISSN

1932-8184

eISSN

1937-9234

Language

eng

Publication classification

C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal