Teaching technologies, attendance, learning and the optimal level of access to online materials

A stylized game-theoretic model explores the relationship between a lecturer and a representative student in a university class. The lecturer moves first, choosing the student's level of access to online class materials, from zero to 100%. The student observes the lecturer's choice, and then chooses whether to attend or skip class. The student has a valuable outside option during class time, but she also values learning. Out-of-class learning cannot perfectly substitute in-class learning. The student's decision depends on her outside option and the level of access to online materials chosen by the lecturer. For extreme parameter values, the student's optimal action does not depend on the lecturer's choice; in these cases there is full access to online materials, as the lecturer anticipates the student's choice. If parameters lie in a range where the lecturer's action may influence the student, then the lecturer provides the maximum level of access to online materials that still incentivizes the student to attend class. Online policies adopted by universities may affect learning outcomes, the intensity of use of online technologies, and attendance. This paper analyzes two types of university policies about the access to online materials.