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The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting

Version 2 2024-06-13, 09:26
Version 1 2015-09-24, 21:51
journal contribution
posted on 2024-06-13, 09:26 authored by S Brusco, M Dziubiński, J Roy
We consider the Hotelling–Downs model with n⩾3n⩾3 office-seeking candidates and runoff voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilibria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) and divergent (candidates locate at distinct positions), though only divergent equilibria are robust to free entry. Moreover, two-policy equilibria exist under any distribution of votersʼ ideal policies, while equilibria with more than two policies exist generically but under restrictive conditions that we characterize.

History

Journal

Games and economic behavior

Volume

74

Pagination

447-469

Location

Amsterdam, The Netherlands

ISSN

0899-8256

Language

eng

Publication classification

C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal, C Journal article

Copyright notice

2011, Elsevier

Issue

2

Publisher

Elsevier