The complicit role of local government authorities in corporate bribery: Evidence from a tax collection reform in China
Version 2 2024-06-06, 01:45
Version 1 2021-03-05, 08:33
journal contribution
posted on 2024-06-06, 01:45 authored by C Cao, Xiaoyang LiXiaoyang Li, C XiaThe complicit role of local government authorities in corporate bribery: Evidence from a tax collection reform in China
History
Journal
China Economic ReviewVolume
65Article number
ARTN 101578Pagination
1 - 14Location
Amsterdam, The NetherlandsPublisher DOI
ISSN
1043-951XeISSN
1873-7781Language
EnglishPublication classification
C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal, C Journal articlePublisher
ELSEVIER SCIENCE INCUsage metrics
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Keywords
Social SciencesEconomicsBusiness & EconomicsTax collectionCorporate briberyLocal government complicityCORRUPTIONDECENTRALIZATIONFIRMSCOMPETITIONFEDERALISMBUSINESSDETERMINANTSINSTITUTIONSINFORMATIONPERFORMANCEDepartment of Economics3501 Accounting, auditing and accountability3502 Banking, finance and investment
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