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The kalai/smorodinsky solution with time preferences

journal contribution
posted on 1989-01-01, 00:00 authored by Nejat AnbarciNejat Anbarci
Even under complete information, the Rubinstein scheme does not generate a unique (subgame) perfect equilibrium partition unless the players are risk neutral. In the standard cooperative bargaining literature, on the other hand, time preferences of players do not play any role. It is assumed that players negotiate as long as they want to without foregoing any portion of the pie. The discount factors are not used, even when they are available; this amounts to limiting the available information use in the bargaining problem. By characterizing a modified Kalai/Smorodinsky solution axiomatically the above problems have been tried to be solved.

History

Journal

Economics letters

Volume

31

Issue

1

Pagination

5 - 7

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Location

Amsterdam, The Netherlands

ISSN

0165-1765

eISSN

1873-7374

Language

eng

Publication classification

C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

1989, Elsevier Science B.V.

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