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The nature of corruption deterrence in a competitive media sector

journal contribution
posted on 01.08.2006, 00:00 authored by Samarth VaidyaSamarth Vaidya
This paper compares the deterrence provided by a competitive media sector towards government induced corruption with that of a media monopoly in a setting where the media might raise both true as well as false allegations of corruption. It finds that competition’s impact on corruption deterrence is not necessarily better than a monopoly but rather hinges on a delicate balance between government’s kickback from corruption and the media’s potential benefit from exposure. While the paper does identify conditions in which a competitive media sector would improve upon the deterrence provided by a monopoly, it also find conditions under which it would do no better than a monopoly and in some situations its strategic response could be even worse especially when it intensifies effort towards justifying false allegations.

History

Journal

Economics of governance

Volume

7

Issue

3

Pagination

229 - 243

Publisher

Springer-Verlag

Location

Berlin, Germany

ISSN

1435-6104

eISSN

1435-8131

Language

eng

Publication classification

C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

Springer-Verlag, 2006

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