The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard : the ex post contracting case
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posted on 2012-01-01, 00:00 authored by Randolph SilversThe value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard : the ex post contracting case
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Maryland Heights, Mo.Language
engPublication classification
C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journalCopyright notice
2011, Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Journal
Games and economic behaviorVolume
74Pagination
352 - 365ISSN
0899-8256eISSN
1090-2473Usage metrics
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