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The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard : the ex post contracting case

journal contribution

posted on 2012-01-01, 00:00 authored by Randolph Silvers

The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard : the ex post contracting case

History

Journal

Games and economic behavior

Volume

74

Issue

1

Pagination

352 - 365

Publisher

Academic Press

Location

Maryland Heights, Mo.

Publisher DOI

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.002

ISSN

0899-8256

eISSN

1090-2473

Language

eng

Publication classification

C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

2011, Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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Keywords

Moral hazard Information Technology Social Sciences Economics Business & Economics Principal-agent Informed principal Ex post contracting

Licence

All Rights Reserved

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