Thoughts on Philosophy and Evil

Philosophers should be passionate about this subject, if they are
passionate about anything. But we should try not to let our passions
blind us to sober, good faith reasoning, otherwise we will cease being
philosophers at all. So, at the risk of repetition, let me underscore one
last time very clearly what I have argued in this paper, and what I have
not.
1. Evil involves the knowing desire to cause crippling life-,
meaning-, or world-destroying harm to (an)other morally
salient being(s), for no publically justifiable reason(s);
2. Not all philosophy “is” evil, or forms or justifies evil beliefs,
motivations, or actions;
3. Philosophy’s training of people to challenge their own and
others’ beliefs, as well as the immoderate beliefs at play in
strong passions, can play a small but vital role in challenging the intellectual preconditions and rationalizations of forms of
evil;
4. Some philosophies nevertheless have formed and rationalized
evil-generative beliefs, motivations, and actions, including
justifying the very worst historical evils, which makes a
metaphilosophical reflection on this subject morally serious;
5. The only justifications evil agents can seek for their actions
must be supramoral, calling into question ordinary beliefs, and
as such they will tend to be “philosophy-like” or “pseudophilosophical”, if not formally philosophical;
6. Evil-justifying beliefs such as those positing malign invisible
conspiracies which must be combatted, like philosophical
visions, posit hidden causes and principles shaping apparent
actions and events which call into question standard opinions
and perceptions, and to this extent also are pseudophilosophical (but see 3);
7. We should be very careful about attempts to deny 4, including
by suppressing reference to disturbing passages in renowned
philosophers, lest this action inadvertently participates in one
dimension of evil, the need to publically deny its existence or
possibility;
8. The denial that any putative philosophy that propounds evilgenerative beliefs or prescriptions can be “philosophical” is
understandable, but insufficient;
9. Philosophy’s search for hidden causes, natures, structures and
functions that explain reality as we ordinarily experience it,
outside or “above” the “city” of most human life presents a
vocational hazard that philosophers should guard against: that
of looking down with scorn, contempt, or even hatred of nonphilosophers;
10. looking down with scorn, contempt, or even hatred of nonphilosophers is one possible evil-generative belief, or it can
cross-pollinate other evil-generative beliefs appealing to other,
non-philosophical morality-trumping reasons to scorn, hate,
and thus potentially justify cripplingly harming others;
11. a metaphilosophy which does not address the relationship
between philosophy and evil, as Plato did by including Callicles and Thrasymachus amongst Socrates’ interlocutors, will be decisively incomplete.