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Toward a 50%-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed

journal contribution
posted on 2017-11-01, 00:00 authored by H Crès, Utku UnverUtku Unver
Consider a two-dimensional spatial voting model. A finite number m of voters are randomly drawn from a (weakly) symmetric distribution centered at O. We compute the exact probabilities of all possible Simpson-Kramer scores of O. The computations are independent of the shape of the distribution. The resulting expected score of O is an upper bound of the expected min-max score.

History

Journal

Mathematical social sciences

Volume

90

Pagination

145-149

Location

Amsterdam, The Netherlands

ISSN

0165-4896

Language

eng

Publication classification

C Journal article, C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

2016, Elsevier B.V.

Publisher

Elsevier

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