Vested interest in the decision to resolve social dilemma conflicts

This exploratory study investigated the degree of correspondence between individual and group interests in the decision to adopt a sanctioning system to manage a shared resource with social dilemma properties. Fifty-two groups of four people accessed a "free-running" computer-simulated shared resource and had either equal or unequal resource access and experienced either an equitable or inequitable sanctioning system. Consistent with past research, a worse group outcome and greater voting for system change was found under the equitable than under the inequitable sanctioning system. However, at the individual level of analysis, the results suggested that the sanctioning systems did not have the same implications for all group members and that some of those differences predicted voting for system change. The study suggests the need to investigate the various decision frames and inequitable implications associated with structural/institutional change and calls for further investigation of dependencies between micro- and macro-level units of analysis.