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WHEN ASPIRING AND RATIONAL AGENTS STRIVE TO COORDINATE

journal contribution
posted on 2023-11-02, 05:29 authored by Jaideep Roy
The paper studies a game of common interest played infinitely many times between two players, one being aspiration driven while the other being a myopic optimizer. It is shown that the only two long run stationary outcomes are the two static equilibrium points. Robustness of long run behavior is studied to show that whenever the optimizer is allowed to make small mistakes, players are able to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium point most of the time in the long run if the speed of evolution of aspirations is sufficiently fast. However, when only the aspiring player is allowed to make small mistakes, achieving coordination is inevitable and independent of the speed at which aspirations evolve.

History

Journal

INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW

Volume

9

Pagination

461-475

ISSN

0219-1989

eISSN

1793-6675

Language

English

Publication classification

C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Issue

3

Publisher

WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD

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