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Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution

journal contribution
posted on 01.01.2011, 00:00 authored by Nejat AnbarciNejat Anbarci, Ching-Jen SunChing-Jen Sun
We propose a new axiom, weakest collective rationality (WCR) which is weaker than both weak Pareto optimality (WPO) in Nash’s (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) original characterization and strong individual rationality (SIR) in Roth’s (Math Oper Res 2:64–65, 1977) characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. We then characterize the Nash solution by symmetry (SYM), scale invariance (SI), independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and our weakest collective rationality (WCR) axiom.

History

Journal

Social choice and welfare

Volume

37

Issue

3

Pagination

425 - 429

Publisher

Springer-Verlag

Location

Dordrecht , The Netherlands

ISSN

0176-1714

Language

eng

Publication classification

C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

2010, Springer-Verlag