Deakin University
Browse

File(s) under permanent embargo

house allocation with existing tenants: a characterization

journal contribution
posted on 2010-07-01, 00:00 authored by T Sönmez, Utku UnverUtku Unver
We analyze mechanisms that are used to allocate dormitory rooms to students at college campuses. Students consist of newcoming freshmen, who do not currently occupy any rooms, and more senior students each of whom occupies a room from the previous year. In addition to the rooms already occupied by the existing tenants, there are vacated rooms by the graduating class. Students have strict preferences over dormitory rooms. Each student shall be assigned a dormitory room in an environment where monetary transfers are not allowed. An existing tenant can move to another room as a result of the assignment. We show that you request my house-I get your turn mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are Pareto-efficient, individually rational, strategy-proof, weakly neutral, and consistent. © 2009.

History

Journal

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

69

Issue

2

Pagination

425 - 445

Publisher

Elsevier

Location

Amsterdam, The Netherlands

ISSN

0899-8256

eISSN

1090-2473

Language

eng

Publication classification

C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal; C Journal article

Copyright notice

2009 Elsevier

Usage metrics

    Research Publications

    Categories

    No categories selected

    Exports

    RefWorks
    BibTeX
    Ref. manager
    Endnote
    DataCite
    NLM
    DC