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Expert-captured democracies

Version 2 2024-06-13, 15:13
Version 1 2022-03-17, 08:31
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posted on 2024-06-13, 15:13 authored by A Chakraborty, P Ghosh, J Roy
Does public cheap talk by a biased expert benefit voters? The answer depends on the nature of democratic institutions and the extent of communication possibilities. Expert endorsements induce office-seeking parties to serve the expert’s interests, hurting voters. Expert advocacy makes policies respond to information, helping voters. Together, policy advocacy and partisan endorsements are often better than either alone. Their interaction creates a delegation benefit that makes indirect democracy superior to direct democracy and office-seeking parties better than those motivated by public interest. But voter welfare is highest when an expert captured technocratic party competes against an uninformed populist one. (JEL D72, D82)

History

Journal

American Economic Review

Volume

110

Pagination

1-50

ISSN

2454-1427

eISSN

1944-7981

Language

eng

Publication classification

A6.1 Research report/technical paper

Issue

299

Publisher

Delhi School of Economics

Place of publication

Dehli, India

Source

Working Paper

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