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Nash demand game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Version 2 2024-06-03, 14:18
Version 1 2015-09-03, 15:20
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posted on 2024-06-03, 14:18 authored by Nejat AnbarciNejat Anbarci, JH Boyd III
We introduce two new variations on the Nash demand game. One, like all known Nash-like demand games so far, has the Nash solution outcome as its equilibrium outcome. In the other, the range of solutions depends on an exogenous breakdown probability; surprisingly, the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome proves to be the most robust equilibrium outcome. While the Kalai- Smorodinsky solution always finishes on top, there is no possible general ranking among the remaining solution concepts considered; in fact, the rest of the solution concepts take their turns at the bottom at various bargaining problems, depending on the specifics of the bargaining setup.

History

Pagination

1-16

Language

eng

Publication classification

CN.1 Other journal article

Publisher

Deakin University, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance

Place of publication

Geelong, Vic.

Series

School Working Paper - Economics Series ; SWP 2008/11

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