Financial safety nets: reconstructing and modelling a policymaking metaphor

Kane, Edward 2001, Financial safety nets: reconstructing and modelling a policymaking metaphor, Journal of international trade and economic development, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 237-273, doi: 10.1080/09638190110061302.

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Title Financial safety nets: reconstructing and modelling a policymaking metaphor
Author(s) Kane, Edward
Journal name Journal of international trade and economic development
Volume number 10
Issue number 3
Start page 237
End page 273
Publisher Routledge
Place of publication Oxon, England
Publication date 2001
ISSN 0963-8199
Summary This paper explains that financial safety nets exist because of difficulties in enforcing contracts and shows that elements of deposit-insurance schemes differ substantially across countries. It shows that differences in the design of financial safety nets correlate significantly with differences in the informational and contracting environments of individual countries and that a country's GDP per capita is correlated with proxies for a country's level of: (1) informational transparency, (2) contract enforcement and deterrent rights, and (3) accountability for safety net officials. The analysis portrays deposit insurance as a part of a country's larger safety net and contracting environment. This means that there is no universal method for preventing and resolving banking problems and that the structure of a country's safety net should evolve over time with changes in private and government regulators' capacity for valuing financial institutions, disciplining risk taking and resolving insolvency promptly, and for being held accountable for how well they perform these tasks.
Language eng
DOI 10.1080/09638190110061302
Field of Research 140210 International Economics and International Finance
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©2001, Taylor & Francis Ltd
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Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
School of Economics
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