The nature of corruption deterrence in a competitive media sector

Vaidya, Samarth 2006, The nature of corruption deterrence in a competitive media sector, Economics of governance, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 229-243, doi: 10.1007/s10101-006-0010-3.

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Title The nature of corruption deterrence in a competitive media sector
Author(s) Vaidya, SamarthORCID iD for Vaidya, Samarth
Journal name Economics of governance
Volume number 7
Issue number 3
Start page 229
End page 243
Publisher Springer-Verlag
Place of publication Berlin, Germany
Publication date 2006-08
ISSN 1435-6104
Keyword(s) corruption
Summary This paper compares the deterrence provided by a competitive media sector towards government induced corruption with that of a media monopoly in a setting where the media might raise both true as well as false allegations of corruption. It finds that competition’s impact on corruption deterrence is not necessarily better than a monopoly but rather hinges on a delicate balance between government’s kickback from corruption and the media’s potential benefit from exposure. While the paper does identify conditions in which a competitive media sector would improve upon the deterrence provided by a monopoly, it also find conditions under which it would do no better than a monopoly and in some situations its strategic response could be even worse especially when it intensifies effort towards justifying false allegations.
Language eng
DOI 10.1007/s10101-006-0010-3
Field of Research 140299 Applied Economics not elsewhere classified
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©Springer-Verlag, 2006
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Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
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