The kalai/smorodinsky solution with time preferences

Anbarci, Nejat 1989, The kalai/smorodinsky solution with time preferences, Economics letters, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 5-7, doi: 10.1016/0165-1765(89)90102-X.

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Title The kalai/smorodinsky solution with time preferences
Author(s) Anbarci, NejatORCID iD for Anbarci, Nejat
Journal name Economics letters
Volume number 31
Issue number 1
Start page 5
End page 7
Publisher Elsevier BV
Place of publication Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Publication date 1989
ISSN 0165-1765
Summary Even under complete information, the Rubinstein scheme does not generate a unique (subgame) perfect equilibrium partition unless the players are risk neutral. In the standard cooperative bargaining literature, on the other hand, time preferences of players do not play any role. It is assumed that players negotiate as long as they want to without foregoing any portion of the pie. The discount factors are not used, even when they are available; this amounts to limiting the available information use in the bargaining problem. By characterizing a modified Kalai/Smorodinsky solution axiomatically the above problems have been tried to be solved.
Language eng
DOI 10.1016/0165-1765(89)90102-X
Field of Research 140103 Mathematical Economics
Socio Economic Objective 970114 Expanding Knowledge in Economics
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©1989, Elsevier Science B.V.
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Document type: Journal Article
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School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
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