Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution Anbarci, Nejat and Sun, Ching-jen 2011, Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution, Social choice and welfare, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 425-429, doi: 10.1007/s00355-010-0497-y. Attached Files Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads Title Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution Author(s) Anbarci, Nejat orcid.org/0000-0001-5952-8086 Sun, Ching-jen orcid.org/0000-0002-7363-3533 Journal name Social choice and welfare Volume number 37 Issue number 3 Start page 425 End page 429 Total pages 5 Publisher Springer-Verlag Place of publication Dordrecht , The Netherlands Publication date 2011 ISSN 0176-1714 Summary We propose a new axiom, weakest collective rationality (WCR) which is weaker than both weak Pareto optimality (WPO) in Nash’s (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) original characterization and strong individual rationality (SIR) in Roth’s (Math Oper Res 2:64–65, 1977) characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. We then characterize the Nash solution by symmetry (SYM), scale invariance (SI), independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and our weakest collective rationality (WCR) axiom. Language eng DOI 10.1007/s00355-010-0497-y Field of Research 140101 History of Economic Thought Socio Economic Objective 910299 Microeconomics not elsewhere classified HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal Copyright notice ©2010, Springer-Verlag Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30036871 Document type: Journal Article Collections: Faculty of Business and Law School of Accounting, Economics and Finance Related Links Link Description Connect to published version (restricted access) Go to link with your DU access privileges     Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved. Versions Version Filter Type Mon, 19 Sep 2011, 15:22:19 EST Tue, 20 Sep 2011, 15:27:06 EST Tue, 20 Sep 2011, 15:28:12 EST Wed, 26 Oct 2011, 13:35:45 EST Wed, 26 Oct 2011, 13:37:11 EST Tue, 03 Feb 2015, 12:52:07 EST Filtered Full Citation counts:   Cited 7 times in TR Web of Science Cited 7 times in Scopus Search Google Scholar Access Statistics: 728 Abstract Views, 4 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics Created: Mon, 19 Sep 2011, 15:22:05 EST by Aysun Alpyurek