Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution Anbarci, Nejat and Sun, Ching-jen 2011, Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution, Social choice and welfare, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 453-470, doi: 10.1007/s00355-010-0499-9. Attached Files Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads Title Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution Author(s) Anbarci, Nejat orcid.org/0000-0001-5952-8086 Sun, Ching-jen orcid.org/0000-0002-7363-3533 Journal name Social choice and welfare Volume number 37 Issue number 3 Start page 453 End page 470 Total pages 18 Publisher Springer-Verlag Place of publication Dordrecht, The Netherlands Publication date 2011 ISSN 0176-1714 Summary Suppes-Sen dominance or SS-proofness (SSP) is a commonly accepted criterion of impartiality in distributive justice. Mariotti (Review of Economic Studies, 66, 733–741, 1999) characterized the Nash bargaining solution using Nash’s (Econometrica, 18, 155–162, 1950) scale invariance (SI) axiom and SSP. In this article, we introduce equity dominance (E-dominance). Using the intersection of SS-dominance and E-dominance requirements, we obtain a weaker version of SSP (WSSP). In addition, we consider α − SSP, where α measures the degree of minimum acceptable inequity aversion; α − SSP is weaker than weak Pareto optimality (WPO) when α = 1. We then show that it is still possible to characterize the Nash solution using WSSP and SI only or using α -SSP, SI, and individual rationality (IR) only for any a Î [0,1)[01). Using the union of SS-dominance and E-dominance requirements, we obtain a stronger version of SSP (SSSP). It turns out that there is no bargaining solution that satisfies SSSP and SI, but the Egalitarian solution turns out to be the unique solution satisfying SSSP. Language eng DOI 10.1007/s00355-010-0499-9 Field of Research 140101 History of Economic Thought Socio Economic Objective 910299 Microeconomics not elsewhere classified HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal Copyright notice ©2010, Springer-Verlag Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30036872 Document type: Journal Article Collections: Faculty of Business and Law School of Accounting, Economics and Finance Related Links Link Description Connect to published version (restricted access) Go to link with your DU access privileges     Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved. Versions Version Filter Type Mon, 19 Sep 2011, 15:30:19 EST Tue, 20 Sep 2011, 15:16:57 EST Tue, 20 Sep 2011, 15:18:00 EST Tue, 20 Sep 2011, 15:29:11 EST Wed, 26 Oct 2011, 13:30:16 EST Wed, 26 Oct 2011, 13:32:04 EST Wed, 26 Oct 2011, 13:33:15 EST Tue, 03 Feb 2015, 12:52:12 EST Filtered Full Citation counts:   Cited 2 times in TR Web of Science Cited 2 times in Scopus Search Google Scholar Access Statistics: 780 Abstract Views, 4 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics Created: Mon, 19 Sep 2011, 15:30:09 EST by Aysun Alpyurek