Stokes, Patrick 2013, Crossing the bridge: the first-person and time, Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 295-312, doi: 10.1007/s11097-013-9302-6.
Personal identity theory has become increasingly sensitive to the importance of the first-person perspective. However, certain ways of speaking about that perspective do not allow the full temporal aspects of first-person perspectives on the self to come into view. In this paper I consider two recent phenomenologically-informed discussions of personal identity that end up yielding metaphysically divergent views of the self: those of Barry Dainton and Galen Strawson. I argue that when we take a properly temporally indexical view of the first-person perspective, and thereby resist the assumption that phenomenally figured and theoretically-figured identity claims must have a common object, the metaphysically awkward accommodations each of these authors is compelled to make cease to be necessary.
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