Should payments for biodiversity conservation be based on action or results? Gibbons, James M., Nicholson, Emily, Milner-Gulland, E. J. and Jones, Julia P. G. 2011, Should payments for biodiversity conservation be based on action or results?, Journal of applied ecology, vol. 48, no. 5, pp. 1218-1226, doi: 10.1111/j.1365-2664.2011.02022.x. Attached Files Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads Title Should payments for biodiversity conservation be based on action or results? Author(s) Gibbons, James M. Nicholson, Emily orcid.org/0000-0003-2199-3446 Milner-Gulland, E. J. Jones, Julia P. G. Journal name Journal of applied ecology Volume number 48 Issue number 5 Start page 1218 End page 1226 Total pages 9 Publisher Wiley Place of publication London, Eng. Publication date 2011-10 ISSN 0021-8901 1365-2664 Keyword(s) Agri-environment schemes Compliance Conservation Contract theory Direct payments Incentives Management Monitoring Payments for ecosystem services Summary There is growing interest in the potential of payments for ecosystem services (PES) to encourage land managers to protect and enhance the environment. However, questions remain about how PES agreements should be designed. There is a division between schemes that structure payments by action or by results, with most biodiversity PES schemes, including European agri-environment schemes, paying by action; for example incentivising land managers to carry out actions believed to increase biodiversity. Payment by results is a common incentive structure in the private sector (e.g. labourers doing piece work or no-win no-fee lawyers) but rarer in PES. Using a theoretical modelling approach, we investigate the conditions under which each way of structuring payments may be more cost-effective in a biodiversity PES. Payment by action is favoured where there is a clear action that can be specified at an appropriate level and to which biodiversity is sensitive. We found that payment by results is favoured in degraded landscapes as incentives are created for managers to use their private knowledge and join the scheme only if they can produce the biodiversity services targeted by the scheme. Payment by results is also favoured where biodiversity is less sensitive to conservation action and when it is difficult for a central agency to determine an appropriate level of conservation action. This is because payment by results allows individual managers to optimise their level of action. The relative cost of monitoring action (compliance with an agreement to manage in a certain way) versus results (the presence of biodiversity) has a substantial effect on which payment structure is more efficient only when the central agency can accurately set an appropriate level of action. We illustrate these principles with examples based on agri-environment schemes. Synthesis and applications. Payment by results deserves more attention from those designing biodiversity PES (be they agri-environment schemes in agricultural landscapes or direct payment schemes in more intact ecosystems). This paper provides a formal framework to help policy makers identify the conditions under which payment by results or payment by action is most likely to yield cost-effective biodiversity conservation. © 2011 The Authors. Journal of Applied Ecology © 2011 British Ecological Society. Language eng DOI 10.1111/j.1365-2664.2011.02022.x Field of Research 050202 Conservation and Biodiversity Socio Economic Objective 960805 Flora, Fauna and Biodiversity at Regional or Larger Scales HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal ERA Research output type C Journal article Copyright notice ©2011, Wiley Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30073637 Document type: Journal Article Collections: Faculty of Science, Engineering and Built Environment School of Life and Environmental Sciences Centre for Integrative Ecology Related Links Link Description Connect to published version Go to link with your DU access privileges   Connect to Elements publication management system Go to link with your DU access privileges     Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved. Versions Version Filter Type Wed, 03 Jun 2015, 10:10:01 EST Thu, 04 Jun 2015, 05:01:44 EST Thu, 04 Jun 2015, 11:34:03 EST Thu, 22 Oct 2015, 13:51:15 EST Fri, 23 Oct 2015, 05:08:24 EST Fri, 06 May 2016, 12:25:36 EST Thu, 08 Oct 2020, 22:35:51 EST Sun, 24 Jul 2022, 07:37:02 EST Filtered Full Citation counts:   Cited 50 times in TR Web of Science Cited 51 times in Scopus Search Google Scholar Access Statistics: 594 Abstract Views, 2 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics Created: Thu, 22 Oct 2015, 13:51:15 EST